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NUCLEAR FREEZE PROPOSAL

OCTOBER 24, 1983.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. PERCY, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany S.J. Res. 2]

together with

MINORITY AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which was referred the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 2) calling for a mutual and verifiable freeze and reduction in nuclear weapons, having considered the same, reports unfavorably thereon.

PURPOSE OF THE RESOLUTION

The purpose of Senate Joint Resolution 2 is to express the sense of the Congress with regard to national arms control priorities and objectives. Accordingly, the resolution states that, as an immediate arms control objective, the United States and the Soviet Union should (1) "pursue an immediate and complete halt to the nuclear arms race;" (2) "decide when and how to achieve a mutual verifiable freeze on the testing, production, and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems; and" (3) "give special attention to destabilizing weapons whose deployment would make such a freeze more difficult to a achieve."

The resolution also provides that, "proceeding from the freeze, the United States and the Soviet Union should pursue major, mutual and verifiable reductions in nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems, through annual percentages or equally effective means, in a manner that enhances stability."

S383-14

BACKGROUND

The Committee hearings and mark-up on the nuclear freeze proposal and other arms control resolutions took place against the backdrop of continued public mobilization and debate on issues related to nuclear war and arms control. The heightened American awareness of the horrors of nuclear war continues to be reflected in petitions, seminars, town meetings, public demonstrations, and state and local referenda. Despite considerable diversity among the public organizations and individual citizens involved in this grassroots movement, one theme has been recurrent: an insistence that the United States and the Soviet Union move without delay to achieve a negotiated agreement that would effectively halt the nuclear arms race.

In response to the public demand for prompt action on arms control, hundreds of Senators and Representatives have introduced resolutions recommending various approaches to achieving this goal, including a joint resolution calling for a mutual and verifiable freeze and reduction in nuclear weapons. This resolution was first introduced last year as S.J. Res. 163 by Senators Kennedy and Hatfield, joined by eighteen other Senators, and was referred to the Foreign Relations Committee.

On June 9, 1982, the Committee met for the purpose of marking up S.J. Res. 163 and twelve other arms control resolutions. During the mark-up, the Committee approved by a 12–5 vote an original joint resolution on nuclear arms reductions (S.J. Res. 212) introduced by the Chairman as a complete substitute for all thirteen resolutions. S.J. Res. 212 did not include the language of the Kennedy-Hatfield freeze proposal, and a Pell-Cranston amendment that would have added the resolved clauses from S.J. Res. 163 to the Chairman's resolution was disapproved by a vote of 10–7. S.J. Res. 212 was never made the pending business of the Senate.

On January 26, 1983, the nuclear freeze proposal was reintroduced as S.J. Res. 2 by Senators Kennedy and Hatfield, joined by 32 other Senators, and referred to the Committee. A companion resolution was introduced in the House. This measure, H.J. Res. 13, as modified by a substantial number of amendments, passed the House on May 4, 1983, by a vote of 278–149. H.J. Res. 13 was placed on the Senate calendar on May 9 in lieu of referring it to the Committee.

COMMITTEE ACTION

The Committee held four days of hearings on S.J. Res. 2 and other arms control resolutions, as follows:

June 21, 1983—Congressional witnesses (Senators Cohen, Nunn, Hatfield, Kennedy, Levin, Garn, Dole, Specter, and Hart, and Congressmen Markey and Leach).

June 22, 1983—Former Directors of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Messrs. Smith, Warnke, Seignious and Rostow) and other public witnesses (Randall Kehler, Susan Catania, Harold Willens, Terry Herndon, Noel Gaylor, William Colby, and Irwin Redlander).

June 23, 1983—Administration witness (Deputy Secretary of State Dam).

September 14, 1983—Administration witness (Executive Session—Top Secret, with Admiral Howe, Department of State).

On August 2, 1983, the Committee met in accordance with Senate Rule 26, which provides that a special meeting of the Committee shall be held upon the written request of a majority of the Members of the Committee. Such a request was made in writing on July 27 by Senators Pressler, Pell, Biden, Glenn, Sarbanes, Zorinsky, Tsongas, Cranston and Dodd. During the meeting, Senator Cranston made a motion that the Committee vote on S.J. Res. 2 without amendment at a time certain that morning. Senator Helms objected to voting at the time certain, and the Chairman ruled that under Senate rules a motion to vote at a time certain required unanimous consent, thereby denying the motion. A Cranston appeal of the ruling of the Chairman was defeated on a vote on 9–8. Accordingly, the Committee did not complete action at this meeting on S.J. Res. 2 or any of the other arms control resolution under consideration.

On September 20, the Committee met for the purpose of marking up S.J. Res. 2 and the following arms control resolutions:

S.J. Res. 12—Relative to arms control negotiations.

S.J. Res. 29—To prevent nuclear testing.

S.J. Res. 74—To express the sense of the Congress that the United States should promote the goal of strategic stability and reduce the risk of nuclear war through a balanced program of force modernization together with negotiations to achieve substantial, verifiable, and militarily significant reductions to equal levels in the nuclear arsenals of both superpowers.

S. Con. Res. 46—Expressing the sense of the Congress regarding negotiations for the reduction and control of nuclear arms.

S. Res. 57—Expressing the sense of the Senate that the Government of the United States and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should adhere to the principle of a mutual guaranteed builddown of nuclear forces.

S. Res. 83—For Strategic Talks on Prevention (S.T.O.P.).

S. Res 107—Relating to nuclear arms reduction negotiations.

S. Res. 142—To limit multiple warhead ICBM's.

S. Res. 159—Expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States should propose a mutual pause in flight tests of new MIRV'd ICBMs and seek an arms control agreement in the START talks incorporating the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission.

All of these resolutions except S.J. Res. 2 were consolidated into an original joint resolution introduced by Senators Percy, Pressler and Boschwitz. For a review of Committee action on the Percy/Pressler/Boschwitz resoltuion, see the Committee report accompanying this original joint resolution.

During the markup, the following record votes were taken on S.J. Res. 2:

A motion by the Chairman to report S.J. Res. 2 without amendment with a favorable recommendation was defeated by a vote of 10–7. Those present and voting nay were Senators Percy, Helms, Lugar, Mathias, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, and Murkowski.

Those present and voting aye were Senators Pell, Glenn, Sarbanes, Tsongas, Cranston, and Dodd. Senators Baker and Zorinsky voted nay by proxy. Senator Biden voted aye by proxy.

A Mathias motion to report S.J. Res. 2 and the original Percy/Pressler/Boschwitz joint resolution, both without recommendation was not approved by a majority of those present and voting. The vote of those present and voting was 7–7. Those present and voting aye were Senators Mathias, Pell, Glenn, Sarbanes, Tsongas, Cranston, and Dodd. Those present and voting nay were Senators Percy, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, and Murkowski. Senators Biden and Zorinsky voted aye by proxy, and Senator Baker voted nay by proxy.

A Cranston motion to report S.J. Res. 2 and the original Percy/Pressler/Boschwitz joint resolution both with an unfavorable recommendation was passed by a 10–4 vote. Those voting aye were Senators Percy, Mathias, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pell, Glenn, Sarbanes, Tsongas, Cranston and Dodd. Those voting nay were Senators Helms, Lugar, Pressler and Murkowski.

COMMITTEE COMMENTS

Congress is vested with the special, and extremely important, responsibility of translating the outcry of public concern about nuclear war into practical, and prudent, policies. However, fervently the freeze or any other resolution may be supported by segments of our society, any treaty that eventually incorporates a particular arms control approach will have to receive a two-thirds approval in the Senate to enter into force.

We continue to have serious concerns about S.J. Res. 2 in its present form, concerns which explain why the freeze does not command the support of a majority of the Committee. The first problem is that the resolution would sanction each side's keeping what they now have, and clearly the levels of nuclear weaponry deployed on each side are unacceptably high. For example, if we were to freeze now, the Soviets would be authorized to maintain 308 SS–18 ICBMs, each with ten warheads, 330 SS–19 ICBMs, each with six warheads, 150 SS–17 ICBMs, each with four warheads, 610 older ICBMs with one warhead each, 145 heavy bombers, (excluding Backfire), 160 Delta-class submarine-launched ballistic missiles, each with three warheads, and 790 other SLBMs, each with one warhead.

That is a total of 7,540 strategic warheads, and there are, in addition, thousands of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. The United States has comparable numbers. Under the terms of S.J. Res. 2, negotiations on reductions would have to await the outcome of lengthy negotiations on the freeze. The Soviets have already offered in START to cut their strategic forces by more than 25 percent. The question can be raised, why should we spend time negotiating an agreement that would let them keep what they have when they have already indicated willingness to reduce by at least 25 percent.

Second, in our judgment and that of our European allies, a total nuclear freeze would undermine NATO's December 1979 "dual track" decision on intermediate nuclear forces (INF) and undercut

the Alliance's efforts to negotiate the total elimination of all nuclear land-based missiles of intermediate range deployed in Europe—the so-called "zero option." This year, the German and British people overwhelmingly re-elected Chancellor Kohl and Prime Minister Thatcher, respectively, and in so doing indicated that they are fully prepared to accept the deployment of new INF systems on their soil, should the arms control talks in Geneva fail to provide a negotiated solution to the threat posed by the Soviet SS–20 missiles. An American endorsement of the freeze proposal now would pull the rug out from under the German and British governments and our other close allies in NATO.

Third, a freeze would be enormously difficult to verify. This is not to say that verification provisions for a freeze could not conceivably be worked out. If we were able to gain Soviet consent to an unprecedented degree of on-site inspection and monitoring, a freeze might be verifiable. But this would take a very long time to negotiate. And this time could be better spent negotiating significant reductions.

Lastly, we do not accept the central premise of the freeze that all strategic modernization is necessarily detrimental to strategic stability. Some modernization is needed simply because older systems, like our B–52 bombers, are literally falling apart. Other programs, such as the new, small single-warhead ICBM recommended by the Scowcroft Commission, could enhance the survivability of the U.S. retaliatory force and thereby discourage the Soviets from entertaining any notions of a first strike. A total freeze—one which allowed for no exceptions—would thus not only force us to maintain increasingly obsolete and unsafe systems but also perpetuate current instabilities.

In summary, we applaud the freeze movement for bringing public awareness to bear on the problem of lessening the prospects of a nuclear war occurring. This has indeed been a remarkable accomplishment. But we do not think that S.J. Resolution 2 offers a realistic or prudent solution to this problem.

COST ESTIMATE

In accordance with Rule XXVI, paragraph 11(a) of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that there will be no budgetary impact from the passage of this Resolution. The following estimate was provided by the Congressional Budget Office:

U.S. CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
Washington, D.C., September 30, 1983.

Hon. CHARLES H. PERCY,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to Section 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Congressional Budget Office has reviewed S.J. Res. 2 calling for a mutual and verifiable freeze and reduction in nuclear weapons, as ordered reported by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on September 20, 1983.

The passage of this resolution will not mandate any changes to military procurement or operations. Accordingly, it is expected that no additional cost to the government would be incurred as a result of enactment of this legislation. In addition, passage of this resolution would have no impact on costs to state and local governments.

Should the Committee so desire, we would be pleased to provide further detail on this cost estimate.

Sincerely,

RUDOLPH G. PENNER,
Director.

REGULATORY IMPACT AND CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

In accordance with Rule XXVI, paragraphs 11(b) and 12 of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee concludes that there will be no regulatory impact from the passage of this joint resolution. There will also be no repeal or amendment of existing law.

MINORITY VIEWS OF MESSRS. PELL, BIDEN, GLENN, SARBANES, TSONGAS, CRANSTON, AND DODD

INTRODUCTION

There is no question that nuclear weapons pose a threat of unimaginable proportions to the United States, its adversaries, indeed, the whole world. We must find ways to halt the arms race between the superpowers, and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations. We must then find ways to begin the process of steadily reducing arms levels until nuclear weapons are removed from the arsenals of the nations of the world. Only through such a process can we reduce the possibility of nuclear war and create a safer world for generations to follow.

Depite this imperative, and despite earlier successes in arms control, establishment of a solid and effective arms control regime remains an elusive goal. At a time when so much needs to be done, very little is in prospect.

In the year since the Committee on Foreign Relations last considered various arms control approaches, there has been little evidence of any concrete progress in the several ongoing negotiations. At the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in Geneva, the two sides appear at impasse. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks, also in Geneva, are only now showing signs of increased activity.

Other major negotiations on such crtically important issues as a ban on chemical weapons, a ban on anti-satellite weapons, and a ban on nuclear explosions remain moribund. The Administration continues to oppose ratification of the Threshhold Test Ban Treaty negotiated in the Nixon Administration and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, negotiated in the Ford Administration.

The current negotiations in START and INF could, if successful, mitigate the future threat. We do not quarrel with the objectives of either negotiation. There is no question, however, that agreement in these negotiations will likely be long in coming, if it is achieved at all. We are convinced of the necessity of having some sort of restraint regime in place pending agreement in START and INF and the initiation of other arms control efforts.

NUCLEAR FREEZE

We believe that a negotiated mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear warhead missiles and other delivery systems is an excellent and commendable first step in establishing a process of arms reductions. This concept is relatively new, yet is has caught the attention and enthusiastic support of millions of Americans. The freeze movement served to push the Administration to begin the START and INF negotia-

tions. Those who support the freeze have been in the forefront of efforts to halt the arms race and begin the process of reductions. Earlier this year, a consensus resolution endorsing the nuclear freeze was approved by the full House of Representatives in a 278–149 vote.

Last year, Senators Pell and Cranston offered, during the markup of a multifaceted arms control resolution, an amendment incorporating the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution calling upon the Administration to pursue a nuclear freeze with the Soviets. At the markup on September 20, 1983, Senator Cranston, supported by Senator Pell and others, moved the adoption of the nuclear freeze as set forth in S.J. Res. 2, introduced by Senators Kennedy and Hatfield and 32 other cosponsors. Unfortunately, this motion was rejected, 7–10, but the Committee decided in a 10–4 vote to give the full Senate an opportunity to pass judgment on this critically important issue.

S.J. Res. 2 would have the Congress resolve:

> That (1) as an immediate arms control objective, the United States and the Soviet Union should—
>
> (a) pursue an immediate and complete halt to the nuclear arms race;
>
> (b) decide when and how to achieve a mutual verifiable freeze on the testing, production, and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems; and
>
> (c) give speical attention to destabilizing weapons whose deployment would make such a freeze more difficult to achieve.
>
> (2) Proceeding from the freeze, the United States and the Soviet Union should pursue major, mutual and verificable reductions in nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems, through annual percentages or equally effective means, in a manner that enhances stability.

It is important to underscore that this freeze would be negotiated with the Soviet Union to cover controls which could be verified. If a freeze on a specific arms program could not be agreed upon, it woud not be applied unilaterally. If a provision could not be verified, it would not be applied.

Critics of the freeze proposal often overlook the importance given to reductions in the proposal. The resolution clearly states that, proceeding from freeze, the two sides should pursue "major, mutual and verifiable" reductions in a manner that enhances stability. In other words, the freeze would be a first step towards meaningful arms reductions. A number of proposals for reductions have been offered. Not one of them can match the combination of freeze and reductions as a rational way to ensure stability while negotiated reductions occur.

Unfortunately, the Reagan Administraton has never given the freeze the attention it deserves and has rejected it out of hand. As a consequence, there has never been a meaningful dialogue with the Executive Branch as to how a freeze and reductions regime might be set up and put into place.

Many who criticize the nuclear freeze do so out of ignorance or because they have no interest in such an approach to ending the arms race. Others are expressing genuine concerns. The Committee explored these concerns with a number of witnesses in the course of its hearings, and we have taken care to weigh them carefully. Here are the key questions which have been raised, together with pertinent testimony and assessments:

1. *Would a freeze perpetuate present instabilities and Soviet advantages?*

Answer: The freeze is not designed to perpetuate the present strategic situation, whether it is stable or unstable. It is designed to halt the arms race and open the way to reductions.

Numerous witnesses have testified to the Committee that present differences in the nuclear forces of the two sides are not significant. Virtually all serious students of nuclear weaponry agree that rough strategic parity exists. Earlier this year, the Scowcroft Commission underscored that point as it rejected the concept that the United States faces a so-called window of vulnerability which must be closed.

With regard to the existing mutual parity, retired Admiral Noel Gayler, former CINCPAC and former Director of the National Security Agency, told the Committee:

> I do not think the Soviets have an advantage of any kind and if there were in fact a discrepancy between the nuclear forces at this level it would not make any difference anyway. I think it has no political utility. It has no military utility. I think a freeze which actually stopped the weapons growth on both sides would simply adhere to the advantage of both sides.

Critics charge that the freeze would allow the Soviets to retain their present formidable force of 308 SS–18 heavy ICBMs, 480 other MIRVed ICBMs, 610 older single-warhead ICBMs, 145 heavy bombers, 10 Delta-class submarines with 16 missiles carrying three warheads each, and 790 single warhead missiles on other submarines.

What these critics fail to mention is that we could also maintain our present vigorous and balanced Triad of forces. We could keep 550 Minuteman III missiles—300 of which have just been equipped with three new higher-yield warheads each, as well as 450 single warhead Minuteman II missiles and the 42 remaining Titan missiles with their hugh single warheads. We have just completed the deployment of new longer-range Trident missiles on 12 submarines, with eight higher-yield warheads per missile, to complement the existing 19-submarine Poseidon fleet. We have already launched five Trident submarines and deployed two of them. We have already deployed about 700 air-launched cruise missiles on a portion of our 264-plane B–52 fleet, and more will come in short order.

What these critics also fail to point out is that the freeze could permanently stop Soviet programs which otherwise would increase the threat to us. The new Blackjack bomber and Typhoon submarine missile programs would be cut off. Backfire bomber deployments would be halted, and the Soviets' embryonic modern air-launched and ground-launched cruise missile programs would be stopped. Finally, they would be prevented from pursuing either the

SS-24 or the SS-25 ICBM programs. No one who cares about our national security should be blind to the advantages such cutoffs afford.

2. *Would not an across-the-board freeze on the testing, production and further deployment of nuclear weapons be very time-consuming, if not impossible, to negotiate?*

Answer: We are calling upon the United States to approach the Soviet Union with a proposition of applying the freeze across the board on testing, production and further deployment of nuclear systems. We understand that each control must be negotiated and that each must be verifiable. Thus, some controls may be worked out and agreed upon more readily than others. Accordingly, if agreement would occur on a step-by-step basis, both sides should be willing to proceed in such a fashion, ensuring all the while that strategic stability was maintained. Thus, the benefits of a freeze would be realized at an early date.

The former SALT II negotiator and Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Paul C. Warnke, urged a step-by-step approach to the freeze:

> . . . dealing first with the technological advantages that constitute a setback for true security, and completing, of course, a comprehensive test ban treaty.

Significantly, neither Mr. Warnke, nor other witnesses with long experience in negotiating and dealing with the Soviet Union, including former Ambassadors W. Averell Harriman and Thomas J. Watson, Jr., expressed doubts as to the feasibility of negotiating the freeze with the Soviet Union.

3. *Would the freeze proposal endorse keeping the weapons of both sides at unacceptably high levels in contrast with deep reduction proposals?*

Answer: No. The freeze resolution calls for reductions of major proportions. Once the freeze was in place, negotiations would move to the more complex matter of working out reductions. However, the negotiating task would be simplified by the existence of the freeze, which would ensure that weapons developments and deployments would not outpace the negotiators. Instead, the negotiators would be dealing with relatively static forces.

Of course, we would not stop with a freeze. As a necessary prelude to genuine reductions, the freeze would cap the arms race; we would then pursue negotiations on reductions assiduously.

In contrast to the freeze, under other proposals, the Soviets would be allowed extensive modernization of their strategic land, sea and air forces. Under some other proposals, the Soviets and the United States would pay a price for modernization, but it would be allowed. Under the freeze, we and they could keep what we have, but only temporarily, before both sides moved on to reductions which would allow only the necessary modernization steps required to enhance stability and reduce the risk of nuclear war.

4. *Would a freeze undercut the INF negotiations?*

Answer: No. We support both the freeze and the INF negotiations. We hope that the negotiations are successful at the earliest possible date. If so, we anticipate that a freeze would be implemented at a reduced level of armaments. It is important that the effort

to achieve reductions continue after imposition of a freeze to ensure that the lowest possible levels of nuclear armaments in Europe are achieved.

Of course, we would only institute a freeze including Europe—as part of a comprehensive, global freeze of U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces—in close consultation with our allies and with their support. It is inconceivable that either we and our allies would institute a freeze which would undercut the INF negotiations.

5. *Would a freeze undercut the START negotiations or any other efforts to reduce arms levels?*

Answer: No, since the incentive for the Soviets to negotiate would remain and since negotiation would be simplified if the forces subject to reduction were relatively static, rather than rapidly expanding and changing.

Former Director of Central Intelligence William Colby told the Committee:

> The Soviets have the same incentive after a freeze as right now without one. Their incentive is to lessen the danger of nuclear war to themselves, aside from to us, and I think that would continue, that a freeze would actually lessen that danger because of the restriction it would place on the development of the new more destabilizing weapons, the higher accuracies and the other features of the newer weapons that are making it more dangerous rather than less.

Mr. Warnke disputed the theory that an arms buildup is the way to get the Soviets to agree to reductions. He said:

> The apparent theory is that we can scare the Soviet Union into making sensible moves toward stabilizing systems by deploying destabilizing systems of our own. Now, the rationale is expressed in terms of bargaining chips, but the theory seems to be that we can make the Soviet Union cry uncle at the bargaining table by deploying MXs, D-5s and by threatening to build still more. This, I submit, is not bargaining. It is instead the arms race theory of arms control, a theory that somehow the Soviets, faced with our determination to go ahead with this massive buildup, are going to give us arms control by default.

Admiral Gayler told the Committee:

> A freeze is a way of maintaining the status quo while making serious efforts in arms negotiations to make cuts. These are not exclusive ideas. It is only the common sense idea that we do not add to weapons while we are negotiating cuts in them. So my reaction is it would not mitigate against serious arms reduction proposals.

Mr. Colby emphasizes that the freeze would simplify achievement of reductions:

> . . . I believe (that) a freeze would assist the process of reduction because without a freeze then the momentum of development of new weapons, of testing of new weapons—in our case the MX, in the Soviet case a new interconti-

> nental weapon—will complicate any attempt to work out a sensible system of reductions.

It is only possible to believe that a freeze would undercut negotiations if one assumes that the freeze would be both the beginning and the end of the negotiating effort.

6. *Would our allies accept a freeze if it were imposed while disparities exist between the intermediate-range missile forces of the two sides?*

Answer: It is conceivable that, with the agreement of our allies, disparities would exist on a temporary basis before agreement on reductions was achieved. The overall global balance in nuclear forces would be maintained. However, as Mr. Colby told the Committee:

> I think at the moment you have to say that the existence of an SS–20 does give an apparent advantage to the Soviets in that theater. However, I think at the same time you have to say that any use of those SS–20s would be more than adequately retaliated for by the forces in the theater—both the American forces in the theater, the British and French forces, which would obviously be available—and by our strategic backup. A freeze would not eliminate any of those, and, therefore, the retaliation would be complete and absolute.

7. *Would a freeze be verifiable?*

Answer: Yes. First, controls which could not be verified would not be applied. Second, specific and tight controls would be applied on a case-by-case basis. This would ensure a high verification standard under a freeze.

Mr. Colby made these points in his testimony with regard to verification:

First, the U.S. will monitor the development of Soviet weaponry with or without an agreement, in order to protect the country. He said:

> If there is an agreement, that process becomes easier, not harder, because those agreements in recent years have all contained provisions which make it easier to monitor the matters limited by the treaties.

Second, under a freeze, the process would be simpler. He said:

> A freeze which says stop, you merely look to see if there is any activity in violation of the freeze. Therefore, a freeze by definition is easier to monitor than one of these complex reduction arrangements and formulae.

Third, a freeze treaty would give the opportunity for additional communication about ambiguous Soviet behavior.

Witnesses made it clear that verification under a freeze would not depend in any regard upon trust of the Soviet Union. Standards for verification under a freeze would be as tough or tougher than those in any other approach to arms control.

8. *Would the freeze stop strategic modernization?*

Answer: The freeze would stop the kind of unbridled arms race, characterized by some as strategic modernization, which has brought us to the present frightening point.

During a freeze, steps could be taken to maintain nuclear forces at their existing level of capability, but not to modernize or increase their destructive power.

Following a freeze, strategic modernization could be pursued during the reductions period in order to enhance stability and reduce the risk of nuclear war.

The overriding consideration would be whether a modernization step would enhance stability—and not be just another lap in the arms race.

Senator Kennedy pointed out to the Committee the central importance of the reductions section, noting that "I think there would be maximum opportunity available to negotiators to breathe life into those words, understanding that the test is whether it is adding stability or whether we are talking about additional new dangerous weapons systems."

CONCLUSION

The superpowers are now pursuing negotiations on strategic and intermediate-range arms. In addition, they must deal with an arms control agenda which encompasses space-directed and space-related weapons, chemical weapons, biological warfare, further controls on nuclear tests and an array of confidence-building measures. Since arms control is not a zero-sum game we can envisage an arms control agreement which enhances simultaneously the security of the United States and the Soviet Union. Since the Soviets continue to profess strong interest in arms control efforts, it is in our national interest to put them to the test of answering to strong and effective arms control measures with solid verification.

The Soviet Union has demonstrated, time and again, that it is a potent and unrelenting adversary with which we must deal shrewdly and dispassionately. We must continue to have a strong defense to ensure that the Soviet Union is never able to threaten our national security. Similarly, we must reinforce our national security through continued efforts to restrain the threat posed by the nuclear and other forces of the two sides. We must be tough and determined in our negotiations. The two superpowers should do their utmost to find areas of potential agreement despite their fundamental differences—not only to serve interests in common, but to fulfill their solemn responsibilities.

We must not underestimate the importance of a freeze and reductions. At this juncture in our nation's history, we seem to have reached a low point in relations with our adversary, with no certain improvement in sight. It is no wonder that millions of Americans fear that the threat of nuclear war is increasing, not diminishing.

Soviet behavior should demonstrate that we must limit the threat that they pose to us and other nations. As the negotiator of SALT I, Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, told the Committee during its hearings, "the deeper we get into the valley of death of nuclear

confrontation, the more obvious it should be that solutions do not lie in more and better weapons systems."

Effective arms control is essential to the national security of the United States. We believe that a nuclear freeze followed by reductions offers the most promising course toward a comprehensive and enduring arms control regime.

We are convinced that the nuclear freeze is a logical and practical way to curb the arms race and reduce the threat of nuclear war. No other approach yet presented offers the same refreshing promise.

CLAIBORNE PELL.
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.
JOHN GLENN.
PAUL S. SARBANES.
PAUL E. TSONGAS.
ALAN CRANSTON.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR. MATHIAS

The lack of consensus within the Foreign Relations Committee about what course of arms control to pursue, be it the Nuclear Weapons Freeze, the "Double Build Down", or more specific incremental measures, reflects the paralyzing absence of a more basic consensus on national security policy within the United States government.

Our first priority must be to develop a bipartisan strategy for defense planning and the conduct of foreign policy. An integral element of that strategy must be agreement on our approach to arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Few would deny that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can derive any advantage out of a situation of nuclear weapons instability. The best way of preventing such instability is by maintaining an effective strategic deterrent in the face of an increasingly powerful and versatile adversary. One of the difficulties in freezing all nuclear weapons systems at one time is that certain stabilizing forms of modernization would actually be prevented. A freeze on the deployment of all delivery systems would preclude the introduction into our force structure of the Stealth Bomber, additional Trident submarines and, at some later point, a mobile single-warhead ICBM like Midgetman.

We need to work on those measures that will increase mutual confidence and promote nuclear stability. I am reminded of Sir Winston Churchill's dictum that not all things must be settled in order to settle some things. As a first step, we must resume Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations. We are obligated, as are the Soviets, by the terms of the Limited Test Ban and Non-Proliferation Treaties to pursue actively a complete halt to nuclear testing.

A sensible next step would be to ratify the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties. These treaties were negotiated, signed and submitted to the Senate in 1974 and 1976, respectively, by Presidents Nixon and Ford. Taken together, these accords establish a comprehensive system of regulations to govern the underground nuclear explosions of the United States and the Soviet Union in a manner consistent with enhanced stability.

Other arms control initiatives demand our immediate attention. We ought to agree with the Soviet Union on limitations on the deployment of Sea-launched cruise missiles, even though the United States has an apparent technological lead in this area. We ought to be doing this right now, in the START talks, before major SLCM deployments make future arms control agreements a practical impossibility.

We must address the problem of militarizing outer space. Certain outer space activity has contributed to arms control; satellites have created new and highly reliable verification procedures. But this

positive aspect is threatened by a space technology that is rapidly providing the ability to destroy these national technical means of verification. If we act now, the devastatingly expensive and lethal programs for the militarization of outer space could die a relatively clean, uncomplicated death. If we and the U.S.S.R. delay, we will be faced with an environment increasingly difficult to control and hostile to human beings a few hundred miles below.

Additional arms control measures which must be explored with the Soviet Union include a flight test ban on new MIRVed ICBM's, and a reappraisal of the effectiveness and necessity of tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Western Europe.

It is still not clear whether the Reagan Administration understands the distinction between arms reductions and arms control. I have been encouraged recently by the President's support for a wide range of confidence-building measures, chiefly improvements in the Hotline; a Joint Military Communications Link with the Soviet Union, and advance notification of U.S. and Soviet ICBM, SLBM, and INF missile tests. But such steps, as well as most of the other measures I've mentioned, do not involve reductions at all, and yet represent enormous steps forward in managing the superpower nuclear relationship. We must strike a balance between the long-term goal of reductions and the immediate need for arms control.

I have deliberately avoided "packaging" these various initiatives in any all-encompassing, comprehensive fashion. I prefer instead to engage the Soviet Union in a number of ongoing negotiations: freezing some systems, reducing others, and preventing other programs from ever beginning. One must choose those areas where success seems most likely or control is most urgent and actively pursue agreement, confident that one success will beget still another, certain that such confidence is a cumulative thing.

Only by addressing our principal adversary with one voice, and with a message that extends beyond any one Administration, can we hope to control and reduce the nuclear menace it poses to the world.

CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MRS. KASSEBAUM

It was unfortunate, but understandable, that the Foreign Relations Committee was unable to have a majority of its members in favor of either of the major proposals before it. I believe that the inability to do so was the result of two factors: the increased tensions in the Soviet-American relationship caused by the destruction of Korean Air Lines flight 007 and the fact that the Administration's INF and START negotiation positions were clearly in a state of flux at the time of our mark up.

The tensions resulting from the KAL 007 disaster unavoidably have affected the attitudes even of those Americans who most fervently seek an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. That was true even though the Administration has properly. I believe, not made any direct linkage between the KAL tragedy and arms control negotiations.

Also complicating our deliberations was the fact that the Administration was in the midst of modifying its INF negotiating position and of considering the implications of a modified formulation of the "build-down" proposal. This situation created uncertainly about the wisdom of amendments to the resolution being considered by the Committee.

Because of these events outside of the Committee's markup, a consensus in favor of either the freeze or the Percy resolution was clearly impossible. Accordingly, I announced my decision to vote against all amendments to either freeze—or the Percy resolutions—during markup. This decision was made most reluctantly, especially in the case of Senator Mathias' SLCM amendment to the Percy resolution. I am a cosponsor and continue to be a supporter of Senator Mathias' initiative. However, to amend such a constructive proposal to a vehicle which had no majority support, in my judgment, was a futile exercise.

For the same reason, I did not offer a proposal by Senator Levin, myself, and ten other coponsors to call for a halt in the flight testing of the MX missiles as, and for as long as, the Soviet Union reciprocates with a halt in the flight testing of its new MIRVed ICBMS. I continue to be a strong supporter and coauthor of that proposal and fully intend to offer it for Senate consideration during floor debate. I strongly believe that the proposal for a mutual ICBM flight test pause meets the various arms control criteria of the Administration, the freeze and the build-down. For that reason, I hope that it will receive broad Senate support.

I voted in favor of Senator Cranston's motion to report to the Senate both the freeze and the Percy resolution in disagreement. To vote either resolution, or both, with no recommendation to the Senate would have been inconsistent with the fact that a majority of the Committee opposed the Senate's adoption of either resolu-

tion. To have voted any other way, I believe, would not have reflected to the Senate the true sentiment of the Committee.

With respect to the proposal for a nuclear freeze, I find it most troubling that many of the advocates of the freeze support one method of arms control to the exclusion of all others. This is especially troubling when the freeze would require the cessation of ongoing negotiations for a sizeable reduction merely to achieve a freeze before reductions can be discussed. For that reason, I have opposed, and will continue to oppose, the nuclear freeze proposal. However, I find it equally disturbing that some of those opposed to the freeze have chosen to question the discretion, and even patriotism, of the supporters of the freeze. To do so, divides the nation on the all-important question of arms control when unity is needed and could be achieved in a less acrimonious atmosphere.

I strongly hope the full Senate will be able to debate the arms control issue at a time when external circumstances will allow a serious and objective debate and the formulation of a national consensus on an issue that heretofore has divided us.

NANCY LANDON KASSEBAUM.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR. HELMS

Both proponents and opponents of the concept of a nuclear freeze ought to be able to agree that the central issue is the question of the best method of preventing nuclear war. The alternatives which face us are plain: Either we continue the proven policy of deterence, or we adopt the new and untested concept of a nuclear weapons freeze. The burden of proof that a nuclear weapons freeze would prevent war must be assumed by those who are putting that view forward.

I submit that the advocates of a freeze have not proved their case. Even though I do not question that both proponents and opponents of a freeze share the fundamental, over-riding objective of preventing nuclear war, there is no agreement on how to achieve this goal.

The fundamental problem is whether we can maintain a nuclear balance and deterence with the Soviets if a nuclear freeze resolution is passed and becomes the rule of U.S. policy. In my judgment, a nuclear weapons freeze is inconsistent with the long-established U.S. arms control objective of equal levels of forces on both sides. The "Jackson Amendment" to the SALT I Treaty in 1972 established the basis U.S. arms control objective of equal levels of forces.

At the present time, the authoritative studies of the nuclear balance—both within government and outside government—show clearly that the Soviets do have strategic superiority over the United States at the present time. Even President Reagan himself has stated several times that the Soviets have strategic superiority. The freeze, therefore, would have the result of locking in forever the stratergic superiority of the Soviets.

Thus a freeze would be inconsistent with the U.S. law of the land. The current objective, namely equal levels of forces, could never be achieved. It would freeze our inequality and our inferiority.

THE SOVIET THREAT

Since SALT I was signed, the USSR has spent $140 billion more than the United States on the acquisition of strategic forces. It is hard to comprehend the meaning of $140 billion. If, during the same period, the United States had spent the same amount, it would have been enough to modernize our strategic offensive forces, and to build up an air-defense system to defeat the growing Soviet bomber threat.

This $140 billion budget would have completely revolutionized our strategic offensives forces. Within that budget, we could have had 100 modern land-based missiles (the MX), 100 modern bombers that could penetrate Soviet defenses and provide the flexibility of manned penetration, 3200 air-launched cruise missiles to provide a

highly accurate system also capable of penetrating Soviet air defenses, and 20 modern, quiet Trident submarines, equipped with long-range missiles that would allow the submarines to patrol in home waters.

But that is not all the $140 billion could have bought. In addition to the above offensive forces, we could also have modernized our air defense system. We could have built 12 airborne warning/controls systems (AWACS), 5 squardrons of modern F-15 interceptors, an "over the horizon" radar to improve early warning, and improved our DEW Line long-range, early warning radars.

Moverover, we could have reduced our vulnerabilities on our command and control communications and intelligence infrastructure, and prepared to defend the MX against a ballistic-missile attack.

All of that could have been procured with the $140 billion that the Soviets have spent in excess of our strategic spending since SALT I. Of course, the Soviets have spent the $140 billion on a different mix of weapons systems, because the Soviet strategic problem is geographically different from ours. But if we had made the same effort in defense spending as the Soviets made, we would now be able to have equal and balanced forces, making a freeze worthy of consideration. But we did not. (See attached charts.)

U.S. AND SOVIET SPENDING ON ACQUISITION OF STRATEGIC FORCES

(1965 - 1987)



FROM THE SIGNING OF SALT I IN 1972 THROUGH 1982, THE TOTAL DIFFERENCE IN SPENDING ON ACQUISITION OF STRATEGIC FORCES IS APPROXIMATELY 140 BILLION

SOVIET SPENDING ESTIMATED IN EQUIVALENT DOLLARS

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NATIONAL DEFENSE AND STRATEGIC FORCES AS A PERCENT OF PUBLIC SPENDING

(1950 - 1983)



THE FEDERAL BUDGET, NATIONAL DEFENSE, AND STRATEGIC FORCES

(1950 - 1983)



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COMPARISON OF DEFENSE OUTLAYS SINCE SALT I

(1972 - 1982)



The nuclear weapons freeze is a seductive slogan, but it is bad arms control. The freeze is unrealistic because it would be massively complicated to negotiate, with its many grey areas (e.g., ASW, air defense, BMD, and Nuclear Power).

The freeze is unverifiable because so much of the Soviet research in undetectible, even with inspections.

The freeze accepts inequities which undermine the principle that arms control agreements must be equal, balanced, and stabilizing.

The freeze undermines current negotiations because it derails the START talks, and the INF negotiations already underway. Indeed, it codifies Soviet advantages, removing the Soviet incentive to reduce, and it would endorse the Soviet position that a balance already exists.

Finally, the freeze is politically useful to the USSR because the prospect of an "imminent" freeze would reduce support for needed U.S. defense programs. Moreover, Soviet leaders could pose as peaceful while pursuing military objectives during the protracted negotiations.

In short, the nuclear weapons freeze would be dangerous for the military balance, and it would impede arms control. It would reward the Soviet Union for its massive nuclear buildup and punish American restraint. It would codify dangerous Soviet advantages, prevent replacement of our aging and vulnerable U.S. systems, prevent safety and security improvements to these systems, undercut NATO deterrence, and undermine U.S. leadership and alliance cohesion. Those who favor arms control must be prepared to admit that a nuclear weapons freeze would be a real setback for real arms control.

SPECIFIC PROBLEMS

Aside from the general framework of issues, there are specific problems which a freeze would make uncontrollable. It should be pointed out that a freeze would prohibit nuclear testing. This means that it would prevent important improvements in nuclear weapon safety and security that are designed into warheads. For example, a freeze would prohibit testing of insensitive high explosives to prevent accidental detonation. A freeze would also prohibit testing and maintenance of integral Permissive Action Links (PAL) to prevent unauthorized or accidental detonation. These are important safeguard mechanisms that need improvement.

A nuclear weapons freeze is not verifiable by our National Technical Means. Furthermore, important tests are possible with little or no risk of discovery, especially low-yield nuclear weapons tests. There would be no way of checking whether or not the Soviets were covertly testing subsystems for insuring reliability—giving them confidence for break-out. Indeed, any kind of production is difficult to monitor because we don't know where present possible covert facilities may be located. In addition, the monitoring of unconventional deployments of strategic weapons is difficult—for example, ICBM's in soft, camouflaged shelters. And of course monitoring the deployments of smaller weapons is extremely difficult; many aspects of a freeze could not be verified even with on-site inspections.

We should also look at some of the specific impacts on NATO. The nuclear weapons freeze would undercut deterrence of conventional war. Soviet military doctrine envisions use of massive military force in a surprise attack to crush NATO within days. But nuclear forces are an essential component of the NATO deterrent. The increasing Soviet SS-20 deployments directly threaten Western Europe. The Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) are essential to restore the nuclear balance and deter both conventional and nuclear attack. The freeze would prohibit deployment both of the Pershing II and GLCM, and induce in the Soviet mind a state or reckless confidence. The reason is that a freeze would accept the present Soviet advantage in intermediate range nuclear forces of 600 to 0.

At the present time, the United States has in development at least eight major strategic and theater nuclear systems which are ready to be deployed in the near future. But only two of them, the air-launched cruise missile and the Trident submarine, have even begun deployment. These are the systems the freeze would knock out:

	Current number deployed
Strategic systems under development:	
MX	0
Trident SSBN (on sea trials)	2
Trident II (D-5) SLBM	0
B-15 bomber	0
Advanced technology bomber (Stealth)	0
ALCM	(1)
Theater systems under development:	
Pershing II	0
Ground launched cruise missiles	0

[1] 7 aircraft, 70 ALCM's.

Thus the initiation of a freeze would have the effect of nipping in the bud our barely minimal attempt to restore some of the balance so desperately lacking today. The United States needs to modernize its strategic nuclear forces in order to bolster our deterrent posture.

A freeze would prevent U.S. strategic modernization, while codifying Soviet modernization, which is a generation ahead of the U.S. in most systems and almost completed. A freeze would prevent replacement of obsolescent launchers of American warheads. The U.S. strategic modernization program would be blocked, yet it is vitually needed. Only 4 percent of total U.S. warheads are on launchers less than 5 years old, and 77 percent of total U.S. warheads are 15 years of older.

In contrast, most Soviet warheads are on very modern launchers. The Soviets have already completed most of their strategic modernization. Fully 70 percent of total Soviet warheads are on launchers less than 5 years old; 95 percent of total Soviet warheads are on launchers less than 10 years old. (See attached chart.)

INVENTORY WARHEADS
BY AVERAGE AGE OF LAUNCHER

1982



As a result of its massive buildup and modernization of strategic forces, the already tremendous Soviet advantage would increase under a freeze. Modern, powerful, and survivable Soviet forces would be effective for many years, while a large portion of American forces would become ineffective due to obsolescence and Soviet defense measures.

Aging American strategic forces cannot maintain deterrence indefinitely. There are many current problems of maintaining deterrence. First, most American SSBNs face block obsolescence in early 1990s. The range of U.S. SLBMs must be extended by Trident II missiles after 1989, in order to increase survivability of submarines. A freeze would block Trident submarine construction and Trident II missile deployment. Meanwhile, a large vigorous Soviet anti-submarine warfare program would be largely unaffected by freeze.

Second, in regard to the U.S. ICBM force, Minuteman is vulnerable and incapable of attacking sufficient Soviet hard targets to maintain deterrence. A freeze would maintain this unsatisfactory situation by preventing U.S. ICBM modernization aimed at increasing survivability.

Third, the U.S. bomber force needs modernization to preserve deterrence. The Soviet air defense system is massive, unaffected by a freeze. The Soviets have deployed 5,000 radars, 2,500 interceptors, and 10,000 SAMs. The Soviets have the best air defense system in the world. The U.S. ALCM is needed as standoff weapon for U.S. bombers, and the B–1B needed to escape destruction of the ground and to penetrate. But a freeze would block the ALCM and the B–1B.

In addition, a freeze would undermine American leadership and NATO unity. The December 1979 decision to deploy Pershing II and ground launched cruise missiles to counter balance Soviet SS–20s was taken by all members of NATO. An American decision to negotiate a freeze would repudiate that NATO decision. Most NATO leaders oppose the freeze because of the threat it would pose to Europe, particularly by blocking NATO INF modernization while permitting the Soviet Union to keep its SS–20s.

In sum, a freeze would codify dangerous Soviet strategic advantages:

Soviet advantage in strategic delivery vehicles—2,704 to 1,756.

Soviet advantage in ballistic missile warheads—7,500 to 7,200.

Soviet advantage in prompt hard target kill potential—over 5:1.

Soviet advantage in ballistic missile throw-weight (pounds)—11,000,000 to 4,000,000.

Soviet advantage in LRINF missiles (SS–4, SS–5, SS–20 vs Pershing II and GLCM)—600 to 0.

Finally, I would like to present some charts which illustrate the above facts about the freeze. These charts were prepared by the Executive Branch, and are accurate.

THE TOTAL WEAPONS IN U.S. STOCKPILE



THE CURVE IS DISCONTINUOUS BECAUSE THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF WEAPONS IN THE STOCKPILE AT ANY TIME BEYOND 1948, IS CLASSIFIED.

This chart shows that the total number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile has declined significantly since 1965. This chart shows that in fact there has been massive U.S. unilateral restraint since 1965, and that there has in fact been no arms race on the U.S. side. Indeed, the U.S. has been going backward, while the Soviets have been going forward. A comparable Soviet line on the chart would rise upward from 1965 to the present.

In addition, this chart does not show several other important facts. First, the explosive power or megatonnage of U.S. nuclear warheads has also declined significantly over the same period. Thus the U.S. has less explosive power.

Second, the accuracy of U.S. weapons has increased over time, thus ensuring that there would be less "collateral damage" to civilian targets should the U.S. warheads ever be fired.

Third, the command and control and safety of U.S. warheads has increased dramatically since 1965, thus insuring that the U.S. President's control over the weapons is enhanced and the likelihood of unauthorized use or nuclear accident is reduced.

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TOTAL STRATEGIC MISSILES AND BOMBERS



*USSR FIGURES INCLUDE SOVIET STRATEGIC MISSILES AND **BEAR**, **BISON**, AND **BACKFIRE** BOMBERS: THE **BACKFIRE** BOMBER IS INCLUDED BECAUSE IT HAS AN INHERENT INTERCONTINENTAL CAPABILITY.

LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILE WARHEADS
(GLOBAL DEPLOYMENTS)



- INCLUDES OPERATIONAL SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20.
- THERE WERE NO NATO DEPLOYMENTS DURING THIS PERIOD.
- EXCLUDES REFIRE MISSILES AND ADDITIONAL WARHEADS.

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE

U.S. (MID-YEAR 1982)		U.S.S.R.	
53	TITAN II	580	SS-11
450	MINUTEMAN II	60	SS-13
550	MINUTEMAN III	150	SS-17
1053		308	SS-18
		300	SS-19
		1398	

SLBMs

320	POSEIDON		SS-N-6
224	TRIDENT I		SS-N-8
544			SS-N-18
		950	

BOMBERS

79	B-52D		BEAR
172	B-52G		BISON
96	B-52H		BACKFIRE
347		356	

APPROXIMATE TOTALS

	U.S.	U.S.S.R.
DELIVERY VEHICLES	1944	2704
— MISSILES	1597	2348
— BOMBERS	347	356
WARHEADS (MISSILE ONLY)	7200	7500
MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT	4.5 Million Pounds	11.2 Million Pounds

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	1950		1962		1972		1982	
	US	USSR	US	USSR	US	USSR	US	USSR
BALLISTIC MISSILES								
ICBMs	0	0	78	40	1054	1500	1053	1398
WARHEADs						1500	2100	5900
SSBNs/SLBMs	0	0	9/144	38/100	41/656	57/500	33/544	70/950
WARHEADs					2200	500	5000	1600
TOTAL WARHEADS	0	0	222	140	3700	2000	7100	7500
NUCLEAR CAPABLE BOMBERS								
BOMBERS	250	0	1700	160	500	150	347	400
BOMBS	250	0	7200	320	2400	275	2500	800

STRATEGIC FORCES STATIC RATIO COMPARISON



PRE-ATTACK COMPARISON:

WEAPONS – TOTAL NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON OPERATIONAL ICBMs, SLBMs, AND BOMBERS

EMT – EQUIVALENT NUMBER OF ONE MEGATON WEAPONS

TIME URGENT HARD TARGET KILL POTENTIAL – PROMPT DELIVERY CAPABILITY OF ICBMs AND SLBMs AGAINST HARDENED TARGETS, MEASURED IN NUMBER OF 2500 PSI TARGETS THAT COULD BE DESTROYED

The U.S. has already tried a "freeze" with the Soviets many times. Under SALT I, we were told by the Nixon Administration that Soviet forces were frozen. Yet during the 1972–1977 5 year period of SALT I, the Soviets deployed 17 new strategic systems, compared to 0 for the U.S. (See attached charts.)

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THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS "RACE"



INTRODUCTION OF SELECTED SYSTEMS BY YEAR

US - 0

USSR - 17 NEW systems

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STRATEGIC MISSILE FORCES

SALT I

UNITED STATES



SOVIET



YEAR OF INTRODUCTION	1960's	1970's	1980's

*CURRENTLY UNDERGOING SEA TRIALS
**CURRENTLY UNDERGOING FLIGHT TESTS

(1) THIRTY-ONE UNITED STATES POLARIS SUBMARINES WERE REFITTED TO CARRY POSEIDON MISSILES. TWELVE OF THESE SUBMARINES MODIFIED TO CARRY THE TRIDENT I (C-4) MISSILE.

KEY:
ICBM = INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE
SLBM = SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE
SSBN = NUCLEAR BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE
ALCM = AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE

There have been other U.S.-Soviet nuclear freezes which have been equally unsuccessful. In 1958, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. mutually agreed to a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing. Yet in 1961, the Soviets abruptly and duplicitously broke out of the moratorium with a massive atmospheric nuclear test series.

In 1964, President Johnson unilaterally ended U.S. production of new nuclear weapons material, and expressed the hope that the Soviets would make the restraint mutual. Instead, the Soviets built several all new nuclear weapons reactors, while the U.S. has dropped from 14 weapons reactors to only 2.

In 1967, the U.S. unilaterally froze the number of ICBMs and SLBMs, in hopes that the Soviets would likewise freeze when they reached parity with the U.S. Instead, the Soviets added 1,000 new launchers for ICBMs and SLBMs between 1969 and 1977, gaining an advantage in missile launchers of over 820.

In 1977, Jimmy Carter cancelled the B-1 bomber, in hopes that the Soviets would show equal restraint. Instead, the Soviets began mass production of the Backfire bomber and development of the Blackjack bomber.

In 1978, Jimmy Carter bowed to Soviet propaganda and cancelled the "neutron bomb" or enhanced radiation warhead, in hopes of Soviet restraint. Instead, the Soviets accelerated their SS-20 deployment.

In 1981, the late Soviet President Brezhnev pledged a unilateral Soviet freeze on their SS-20 deployment. Since that "freeze", the Soviets have added over 60 new SS-20 launchers.

In sum, there have already been 7 U.S.-Soviet nuclear weapons freezes, and the Soviets have violated or ignored each one. Why should we try a new freeze, in light of this history? As former Defense Secretary Brown has stated, when the U.S. builds, the Soviets build, and when the U.S. stops building, the Soviets just keep building.

Finally, the Soviets have deployed a sixth new ABM Battle-Management Radar which flagrantly violates 5 provisions of the SALT I ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty is the only SALT Treaty in force. This is an ominous development boding ill for all further US arms control proposals to the Soviets.

I believe that the Soviets have been breaking out of arms control and SALT for over the past year. President Reagan himself on September 14, 1983 for the second time has charged the Soviets with violating the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement of 1962, which ended the Cuban Missile Crisis. If the Soviets are violating the Agreement that ended the Cuban Missile Crisis, the most dangerous nuclear crisis in history, then the world could be back in a crisis situation. I believe that Soviet nuclear blackmail threats and actual deployment to Cuba of nuclear delivery capable bombers, fighter-bombers, and submarines makes the Soviet nuclear threat from Cuba today more dangerous than it was in 1962.

Finally, it must be pointed out that a freeze at current levels reward the U.S.S.R. for its military build-up but penalize the United States for restraint. The following comparison summarizes the contrasting actions of both the USSR and the United States in this regard:

U.S.S.R.	*United States*
In the last 15 years, 60 SSBNs deployed in 5 new or improved classes.	Now deploying Trident submarines, the first SSBNs built since 1967.
Since SALT I, about ½ of SLBM force replaced with 3 new SLBM types; a new SLBM type is being tested.	1 new SLBM deployed.
Since SALT I, essentially entire ICBM force replaced with 10 variants of 3 new ICBMs.	Minuteman III modified, but no new ICBMs deployed.
Since SALT I, over 250 backfire bombers with inherent intercontinental range.	No new intercontinental bomber in over 20 years.
Since SALT I and ABM Treaty, substantial ABM upgrade of single permitted site.	Only ABM site dismantled in 1976.

Since SALT I was signed, the U.S.S.R. has spent approximately $140 billion more than the U.S. on strategic forces.

In sum, a nuclear weapon freeze is not sensible on legal, strategic, verification, and historical grounds. As President John F. Kennedy stated on March 2, 1963 in regard to the Limited Test Ban Treaty then under negotiation with the Soviets:

> We know enough about broken negotiations, secret preparations, and the advantages gained . . . never to offer again an uninspected moratorium.

With the Soviets now breaking out of all arms control agreements, we could be wise to follow John F. Kennedy's advice and reject a freeze, which is nothing more than a unilateral, uninspected moratorium.

JESSE HELMS.

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